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There is a rich and varied literature on the desirability of using prizes (or awards)
as an incentive for research, inventions, and greater work effort. An important early
article in this area is by Loury[1979].1 Some of this research has addressed the possi-
bility of multiple prizes [Glazer and Hassin, 1988; Lazear, 1997; Nalebuff and Stiglitz,
1983; O’Keefe, Viscusi, and Zeckhauser, 1984; Skaperdas and Gan, 1995]. Further,
much of the work has focused on compensation schemes for workers [Glazer and
Hassin, 1988; Nalebuff and Stiglitz, 1983; O’Keefe, Viscusi, and Zeckhauser, 1984;
Rosen, 1986]. Others have embedded the analysis in a rent-seeking probabilistic con-
text [Fullerton and McAfee, 1999; Lazear, 1997; Nti, 1997; Rosen, 1986; Skaperdas
and Gan, 1995].2
This paper considers the behavior of firms competing for a fixed prize offered by a
social planner, which fixed prize can be shared equally. Usually, in the literature, with
multiple winners, the total prize amount is not fixed, nor is it equally shared. The
model is a hybrid of the traditional tournament model, where the best innovation is
rewarded by a specific date, and an innovation race, where the reward is given to the
first individual to discover a specific innovation in an unlimited time period.3 We use
the functional form shown in Wright [1983], where the individual probability of suc-
cess is independent of others’ efforts. Further, it is possible that the contest results in
no winner. However, because the fixed prize is shared, the individual firm’s expected
benefits from innovation effort are dependent upon other firm’s efforts. The social
planner can consider that behavior in the determination of that welfare-maximizing
optimal prize.
We present three models. First, we present a short-run model where the number
of firms is fixed, and is independent of the social planner. In that model, the optimal
prize may result in the individual firm’s expected profits being less than zero. Next, a
long-run model is presented wherein entry and exit of firms occurs until expected
profits are zero. Finally, we develop a model where the social planner sets both the
amount of the prize and the number of firms. As shown there, the expected profits of
the firm are greater than zero.84 EASTERN ECONOMIC JOURNAL
A SHORT-RUN MODEL
Posit that in a short-run model there are a fixed number of risk-neutral partici-
pants competing for the prize awarded by the social planner. Assume the following
notation:
B = societal benefit from the innovation;
T = monetary prize offered by the social planner for the invention;
n = number of firms;
c = research expenditure by the individual firm on the development of the
invention; and
p(c) = the probability of development of the invention by a certain time by an
individual firm, which is an increasing function of c. This probability
function is common for all firms.
In this model it is possible that by that specified time, no firm will have devel-
oped the invention, and there will be no winner. The probability of that is given as
1-(1-p(ci))n where i = 1,...,n. Thus, this model is a hybrid of the innovation race and the
tournament. As discussed in Taylor [1995, pp. 873-4], “a tournament rewards the indi-
vidual with the best innovation on a specific date, while a race rewards the first indi-
vidual to discover an innovation of a specific quality.” In both of those cases, there is a
winner. Here we are specifying that a particular innovation be achieved by a time
certain. This model is based upon the functional form specified in Wright [1983, 700-
01, equation (14)].4
However, a major difference between the model here and in those other articles is
that in this model: (1) there can be more than one winner; and (2) if there is more than
one winner, those winners share in a specific prize amount, which amount does not
change with changes in the number of winners.
If just one firm develops the invention that firm receives all of the prize, while if j
firms develop the invention they split the prize equally, such that each firm receives
T/j.5 Thus, from the perspective of firm 1, the probability of it winning the entire prize
is p1(1-p2)(1-p3)...(1-pn) where pi represents the probability of firm i developing the in-
vention, which is dependent upon its expenditure ci. Furthermore, by way of example,
the probability of firm 1 sharing the prize with firm 2 is p1p2(1-p3)(1-p4)...(1-pn).
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where Π is the Cartesian product. Note that we assume here that each firm has
knowledge of the common probability function, and has knowledge of the amount
expended by each of the other firms. Because of the sharing of the prize, T, one firm’s
expected gains from the contest is dependent upon other firms’ efforts. Throughout,
we assume that the only benefit that a firm receives from the research is the prize, or
its share of the prize. While a firm, then, obtains no first-mover advantage, it does
receive a greater return if it is the only one, or one among a few firms, to successfully
develop the invention.
Firm 1 seeks to maximize
(2) pVT c 11 1 − ,
where c1 represents the amount that firm 1 spends on research. Let p'>0 and p"<0
represent the first and second derivatives, respectively, of p with respect to c. The
first-order maximization condition for firm 1 is
(3a) ′ −= pVT 11 10
and the second-order condition is p1"<0. At the Cournot-Nash equilibrium, where it is
assumed that all firms are identical, and each firm is doing the best that it can given
the expenditures of the other firms, the firms spend identical amounts. It can be
shown that V = [1-(1-p)n]/np, where p corresponds to the probability of one firm devel-
oping the invention when c, determined from equation (3a) above, is spent, and p and
c are the same for all firms i=1,...,n.
At that Cournot-Nash equilibrium, equation (3a) can be expressed as
(3b) ′ −= pV T 10 ,
which is the private equilibrium condition. By taking the total differential of equation
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The probability of exactly one firm developing the invention is np(1-p)n-1, while the
probability of at least one firm developing the invention is 1-(1-p)n. Obviously the prob-
ability of at least one firm developing the invention is greater than the probability of
exactly one firm developing the invention, so that
np p p
nn (- ) - (- (- ))
- 11 10
1 < . 
Consequently, ∂V/∂c < 0, and from equation (4b), dc/dT > 0. The greater the prize, the
greater the amount spent on research by individual firms.





















We assume that there is no asymmetry in information as between the social
planner and the private contest participants for two reasons. First, we are not at-
tempting to make a relative comparison of patents and prizes, as was done in Wright
[1983]. Second, in our last model we directly compare a long-run decentralized model
with a model where the social planner sets the number of participants. In order to
properly compare those two models we do not introduce the possibilities of informa-
tion asymmetries. The social planner, then, has knowledge of the probability func-
tions, the number of participants, and the amount of expenditures by participants.
The social planner will set the value of T at T* so as to maximize net societal
welfare. As discussed earlier, the probability of at least one firm developing the inven-
tion is equal to 1 minus the probability that no firm develops the invention, or 1 - (1-p)n.
Hence the social planner wants to maximize
(6) Zp B n c
n =[- (-)] - 11
in order to determine the socially optimal value of Z, Z*. Throughout we assume that
the social planner funds the prize through taxes, and is indifferent as to the level of
the prize except to the extent that it can be used to influence social welfare. We also
assume that the social planner is not directly influenced by the expenditures of the
competitors, except to the extent that those expenditures determine the probability of87 FIRM INCENTIVES FOR INVENTION PRIZES
success. The social planner modifies T, which will then affect c and p, until Z in
equation (6) is maximized. The term T does not figure into any social welfare calcula-
tions since it is essentially a one-to-one transfer from taxpayers to inventors. It is
simply a tool used to maximize Z.6 Consequently, its welfare value nets out to zero.







n (- ) ( ) -( )
- 10
1 ′ = ,
where dc/dT is defined from equation (4b). Cancelling out the terms n and dc/dT in
equation (7) produces
(8) (- ) -
- 11 0
1 pp B
n ′ = ,
which is the welfare maximization condition. Given n, B, and the probability function
p(.), equation (8) can be solved for c to obtain the societal welfare maximizing value of
c, or c*. The private equilibrium condition, equation (3b), can be combined with the
welfare maximization condition, equation (8), to yield
(9a) (* ) * (-* ) (* )
- pVT p pB






















the welfare-maximizing prize, where p*,(p*)', and V* are evaluated at c*. Given c*,
determined from equation (8) above, the social planner can then determine the so-
cially optimal value of T and T*, from equation (9b).7
Even though societal welfare is maximized, Z*, the welfare maximum, may nev-
ertheless be less than zero, which implies that all social welfare gains, [1-(1-p*)n]B, are
dissipated by the expenditures of the n firms, nc*. Since V* = [1-(1-p*)n]/np*, Z* from
equation (6) can be expressed as
(10) Zn p V B n c ** * - * = .
This expression is greater than zero when
(11) pV B c ** - *    . > 088 EASTERN ECONOMIC JOURNAL
Proposition 1. The value of the optimal prize, T*, is always less than the societal
benefit of the invention, B.8
As discussed earlier, the probability of exactly one firm developing the invention is
np(1-p)n-1, while the probability of at least one firm developing the invention is 1-(1-p)n.
Obviously the probability of at least one firm developing the invention is greater than
the probability of exactly one firm developing the invention. Consequently,
11 1
1 -( - *) *( - *)
- pn pp
nn > .
Using this result in equation (9b) it can be easily seen that T*<B;9 that is, the
optimal prize will always be less than the societal benefit of the invention, at the social
welfare maximum, Z*.
Proposition 2. Expected profits are positive (negative) if the elasticity of probability
with respect to research expenditures is less than (greater than) one.
By substituting the welfare-maximizing prize condition, equation (9b), into the
term p*V*T* we obtain
(12) pVT p p B
n *** * ( - * )
-    . = 1
1
Further, multiplication of the welfare maximization condition, equation (8), by p* yields
ppp B p
n *( - *) ( *) - *
- 10
1 ′ =    ,
or
(13) pp B p p
n *( - *) */( *)
- 1
1 = ′.
Substitution of equation (13) into equation (12) implies that p*V*T* = p*/(p*)' and that
expected profits are
(14) pVT c p p c **** * / ( * ) * −= ′− .
If the indicated elasticity, (p*)'c*/p*, is <(>)1, equation (14) is >(<)0.
If firms are enjoying short-run expected profits (p*V*T*-c*>0), and since B>T*,
Z*>0. However, the converse is not necessarily true: if Z*>0, firms may or may not
have positive expected profits. In the short-run, firms may have either positive or
negative expected profits.1089 FIRM INCENTIVES FOR INVENTION PRIZES
LONG-RUN MODEL
In a long-run model assume that firms enter and exit until expected profits are
equal to zero11 yields
(15) pVT c −= 0,
which is the long-run firm profits condition.
Proposition 3. In the long-run, the value of c for each firm is independent of T, B, and n.
Combining the private equilibrium condition, equation (3b), with the long-run









where cL is determined from equation (16) and pL is evaluated at cL. Equation (16)
implies that in a long-run model, the value of c, or cL, is independent of T, B, and n,
and that the elasticity of probability with respect to research expenditures is equal to
one. Regardless of the level of the prize, firms will enter and exit such that the ulti-
mate amount of expenditure by an individual firm is unchanged.12,13 This is analogous
to simple models of competition wherein firms will enter and exit as the level of
profits (expected benefits here) changed; although the number of firms changes the
size of the firm (amount of research expenditure here) does not.
However, the number of firms is dependent on T.14 As in the short-run model, the
social planner maximizes Z with respect to T to yield





since dcL/dT = 0. This can be re-expressed as
(17) 11 1 0 −− − − = () l n () pp B c
n
L .
Given cL, determined from equation (16), and B, the socially optimal value of n, nL,
can be determined. In turn those values of cL and nL can be utilized in either equations
(15) or (16) to determine the socially optimal value of T, TL.
Proposition 4. In the long-run model, optimal net societal welfare, ZL, is always
positive.90 EASTERN ECONOMIC JOURNAL
Since B>T* for any value of n, as shown in the short-run model, by equation (15),
pLVLB – cL > 0, where pL and VL are evaluated at cL and nL. From equations(10) and (11),
societal benefits are always positive in this long-run model, and there is no dissipation
of benefits as occurs in some rent-seeking models.15
DETERMINATION OF THE NUMBER OF FIRMS BY THE SOCIAL PLANNER
In this Section we assume that the social planner determines both the prize and
the number of firms that can participate. We will also hypothesize that there are
always sufficient firms wanting to participate such that the social planner will never
be deficient in the desired number of firms. This will occur if expected profits are
positive (which is the case here as will be shown later).
The social planner seeks to maximize [1-(1-p)n]B - nc with respect to n and T. This
results in the following two maximization conditions
(18a) [( )l n ( ) ] [ ( ) ]
- −− − −+ − ′−= 11 1 1 0






1 − ′−= pB p
n ,
where dc/dn is from equation (5),and equation (19) is the welfare-maximizing condi-
tion, equation (8). However, the second term on the left-hand side of equation (18a)
drops out, because of equation (19), so that equation (18a) becomes
(18b) −− − −= () l n () 11 0 pp B c
n .
Equation (18b) can be re-expressed as
(18c) ()
















pp () l n () 11
10    .
Equation (20) indicates that, in this model, the socially optimal value of c, cG, is
independent of the socially optimal value of n, nG, social benefits, B, and the socially
optimal prize, TG.16 The social planner can maximize welfare by adjusting the number
of firms allowed to compete and the prize, but, ultimately, has no control over the91 FIRM INCENTIVES FOR INVENTION PRIZES
“size” (amount of research expenditures) of the firm. This is similar to the result
obtained in the long-run model. However, the socially optimal values of firm expendi-
tures, cL and cG, are not the same in the two models.
Proposition 5. The long-run amount of research expenditure by an individual firm,
cL, is less than the socially optimal expenditure amount cG.
















(- ) l n (- ) 11
.



















(- ) l n (- ) 11
1
by equation (20). Note that pG', pG, pL', and pL are evaluated at cG and cL as the case
may be.
Note that d(p/p')/dc = 1 – pp"/(p')2 > 1 for p"<0. Consequently, d(p/p')/dc > dc/dc = 1.
For all c > cL, (p/p')/c > 1 = (pL/pL')/cL, and for all c < cL, (p/p')/c < 1 = (pL/pL')/cL. By
Equation (23), (pG/pG')/cG > (pL/pL')/cL, so that cL < cG. The optimal value of c with long-
run free entry of firms is less than the optimal value of c when the social planner
determines the optimal number of firms.17
It would be useful to know whether the total expenditures by firms in the long-run
model is greater than the total firm expenditures in the model where the social plan-
ner sets the number of firms. As will be shown below, that will be dependent upon the
sign of the cross-partial derivative of the expected value of benefits, [1-(1-p)n]B with
respect to c and n.
Let us define d[1-(1-p)n]B/dc as the marginal effectiveness of the representative firm’s
research expenditure. Effectiveness is defined in terms of expected value of benefits.
Proposition 6. The total expenditure in the long-run model, nLcL, is greater (less)
than the total expenditure, nGcG, in the model where the social planner sets the number
of firms, as the marginal effectiveness of the firm’s research expenditure decreases
(increases) with the number of firms.92 EASTERN ECONOMIC JOURNAL
Note that in both models the conditions given by equations (17) and (18b) are
equivalent
−− − = () l n () - 11 0 pp B c
n  .
We can take the total differential of the above equation, common to both models, and obtain
(24)
[ ( -) l n ( -) ( -) / ( -) ]
[ - l n () ()
npp p B p p B p d c
pB p




− ′ + ′ −+
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n n dn ].
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Also note that in both models
(26) cp p B
n =− − − () l n () 11
from equations (17) and (18b). Using equation (25) with equation (26) we can deter-







pp B n p
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( ) [( ) ][ ( / ln( ))]
- =+ = − − ′ −+ −  . 11 1 1
1
The right-hand side of equation (27) is less than zero if and only if
(28) −− ′ −− + − <
− [( ) ][ln( )][ ln( )] 11 1 1 1 0
1 pp B p n p
n .
The expression (1-p)n-1p'B-1 is greater than zero in the range of cL to cG by second-
order conditions on equation (19) and because cL < cG by Proposition 5. Further, ln(1-p)
is clearly less than zero. It can be easily shown that the expression 1 + nln(1-p) is less
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The cross-partial derivative term on the left-hand side of the inequality in equa-
tion (29) is the rate of change in the marginal effectiveness of the firm’s expenditure
as the number of firms increases. If that term is negative, then the model of this
section results in smaller expenditures than in the long-run model from the previous
section.
Proposition 7. When the social planner sets the number of firms and the prize, firms
will always expect positive profits.
An obvious concern here is whether the firms involved expect to earn positive
profits. If not, then this model is not a feasible one for the social planner to undertake.









−    ,
where VG is evaluated at cG and nG.
As shown in equation (23), pG'cG/pG < 1, which implies that pGVT – cG = pG/pG'– cG > 0.
Therefore, firms expect to earn positive profits in this model. Furthermore, since
B>TG, societal benefits are not dissipated here.
Finally, the net societal welfare is greater than in the short-run and long-run
models from the earlier sections, since the social planner has an additional policy
instrument, number of firms, not available in those models.
CONCLUSION
This paper considered several multiple winner models with invention prizes, where
the social planner determines the social welfare-maximizing prize. In all of the models
the prize was always less than the societal benefit from the invention.
 The short-run model, with a fixed number of firms, can result in negative ex-
pected profits and, conceivably, a negative expected societal benefit, where the wel-
fare gains are totally dissipated by firms’ research expenditures. In the long-run model,
where firms can enter and exit, it was shown that there is always a positive net
welfare gain. Furthermore, the optimal research expenditure by an individual firm is
invariant to the amount of the prize. Finally, we considered a model where the social
planner set the prize and the number of firms. That model results in smaller total
research expenditures than in the long-run model under certain conditions. It also
represents the preferred policy for the social planner, since it results in the largest
societal welfare (of the three models considered), with positive expected profits for
each firm.94 EASTERN ECONOMIC JOURNAL
NOTES
The author wishes to thank an anonymous referee for helpful suggestions. The usual caveats
apply.
1. Other examples are Baik [1993], de Laat [1997], Hughes [1945; 1946], Lee and Wilde [1980]
Rogerson [1989], Tirole [1988], and Wright [1983].
2. See Corcoran [1984], Corcoran and Karels [1985], Tullock [1967; 1980], and Wenders [1987] for
discussion of the analyses of rent-seeking activity.
3. See Taylor [1995, 873-4]. A variation on the tournament model is the cooperative public goods
case, discussed in Romer [1993].
4. As compared with Wright [1983], this paper considers a long-run formulation and a model where
the social planner sets the number of competitors.
5. This is similar to the approach taken in Berry [1993].
6. Of course, this is not true in the case of a private sponsor for the contest. That case is not
considered in this paper.
7. It is easily shown that p" < 0 is a sufficient condition for second-order conditions to be met. The
second derivative of equation (7) with respect to T is
[n(1-p)n-1p'B - n](dc2/d2T) + [n(1-p)n-1p" - n(n-1)(1-p)n-2(p')2](dc/dT)2B.
The first term in brackets in the above expression is equal to zero by the welfare-maximizing
condition, equation (8). The second term in brackets will be less than zero if p"< 0. Hence, if p" < 0,
the second-order condition is met.
8. As discussed earlier, the term T is essentially a one-to-one transfer from taxpayers to inventors,
and is a tool used to maximize Z. Consequently, it is not necessary that T*<Z*.
9. This is consistent with the discussion of the “common pool” problem discussed in Dasgupta and
Siglitz [1980], and Wright [1983].
10. In the traditional rent-seeking model of Tullock [1980], negative profits occur if the marginal
efficiency of expenditure, r, is greater than n/(n-1).
11. The long-run is discussed in Loury [1979] and Taylor [1995], as well as in a rent-seeking context in
Corcoran [1984] and Corcoran and Karels [1985].
12. Equation (16) implies that c = p/p'. Since  d(p/p')/dc = [(p')2 – pp"]/(p')2 > 1 for all values of c if p"<0,
that means that d(p/p')/dc > 1 = dc/dc for all values of c. Consequently the function p/p' crosses the
45° line function c only one time, and that there is only one value of c that satisfies p'c/p = 1.
13. The primary reason for this is that the probability functional form for the individual firm’s prob-
ability of success can be separated from the probability of success of the other firms. In contrast, in
the Corcoran long-term model, the number of firms is independent of the amount of rents and the
amount of rent-seeking expenditures [Corcoran, 1984].
14. The impact of T on n can be determined by taking the total differentials of equations (15) and (16)
with respect to dc, dn, and dT, and solving for dn/dT. It can be shown that the result is dn/dT =
V/[T(dV/dn)]. Further, the value of n may be fractional in this model,
15. In the traditional rent-seeking models, total dissipation always occurs in the long-run (see Corcoran
[1984]).
16. As in the prior Section, the optimal value of n may be fractional.
17. Proposition 5 is similar to results obtained in Taylor [1995]. However, in Taylor’s analysis a “tour-
nament” model is used, and there is no sharing of the prize among winners.
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